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'Dicta Observes
The lawyer, probably more than any other professional
man, seems to be singled out from time to time as a fruitful
field for disparagement and for attack. The situation is nothing new except that there seems to be a tendency somewhat to
place the lawyer in the class of an insurer. For instance, recently in Colorado a cause of action was filed by a plaintiff in
which the plaintiff's attorney was named as a defendant presumably on the ground that he failed properly to represent
her, although the action in which he represented the plaintiff
was filed and closed a number of years ago. Not very long
ago another individual in Cleveland, Ohio, brought suit in
which his attorneys were named as defendants, also presumably because they had failed properly to represent him.
Anent the recent congressional investigation in Wall
Street one columnist, at least commented disparagingly concerning attorneys and suggested that the bankers, Wall Street
operators and other financial lights would not have been able
to conduct their respective businesses, allegedly in violation
of law or, at least, on the border line, unless a resourceful
lawyer showed them out. Another newspaper writer recently
suggested that when a lawyer advised his client concerning his
legal rights, and the advice was wrong and the client was
obliged to suffer a penalty because he stood on his legal rights,
the lawyer and not the client would be forced to suffer the
penalty. The Federal Government, possibly as an outgrowth
of the congressional investigation above referred to, is now interested in knowing whether or not any person assisted the
individual in making his income tax return.

A

DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX
(By J. W. KELLEY of the Denver Bar)
TRIFLE in contemplation of law must be something

extremely small. Nearly every famous legal decision
rests upon a comparatively insignificant base. In the
Dartmouth College case the matter in dispute was the right
to replevin a corporation seal and minute book. In Marbury
vs. Madison, the litigation arose over the certificate of appointment of a justice of the peace which was functus officio
at the time of the decision, the term of the appointment having expired, The Dred Scott case turned upon a demurrer to
the jurisdiction, the historic part of the decision being merely
dicta. It appears that in the higher brackets of judicature the
more trivial the subject-matter of the suit the more far-reaching the effect of the decision.
For support of the above syllabus see infra.
In 1860 in the State of Kentucky, a Mrs. Hepburn gave
her note for $11,250, to one Griswold, due in two years.
When the note matured it was put in judgment and Mrs.
Hepburn tendered in payment treasury notes of the United
States. Congress, while the note was maturing, had passed,
in the exigent crisis of Civil War, an act providing that paper
money, not supported by coin in the treasury, was legal
tender for all purposes.
Salmon P. Chase was secretary of the United States
Treasury at the time the overwhelming necessity of the war
situation caused congress to issue the paper dollars and no one
was so insistent upon that act as he. When Hepburn vs. Griswold* was argued in the United States Supreme Court, Salmon P. Chase was Chief Justice. Chase the Chief Justice did
not agree with Chase the cabinet officer and he wrote an opinion concurred in by four of the other seven justices holding
that congress under its grant of power to "coin money and
regulate the value thereof," could not make Griswold accept
anything but gold or silver in payment for his judgment.
When this decision was rendered in 1870 the parity of
the legal tender notes with gold had been so nearly restored
that the amount in dispute was extremely small. Mr. Justice
*8 Wall. 603.
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Miller rendered an opinion opposite from that of the Chief
Justice and was supported therein by Justices Swayne and
Davis.
Two years went by.
Meanwhile a Mrs. Lee secured a judgment against one
Knox in Texas for $7,376. The right of Knox to discharge
his obligation in the same kind of money that Mrs. Hepburn
had tendered to Griswold was passed on by the United States
Supreme Court in January, 1872. At that time the premium
of gold over the United States legal tender notes, in spite of
the decision in Hepburn vs. Griswold, was so small as to be
negligible.
Since Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion in Hepburn
vs. Griswold, Mr. Justice Grier had resigned and Mr. Justice
Strong and Mr. Justice Bradley were added to the court, by
appointment by President Grant under an act of congress
increasing the number of judges to nine. The object of this
increase seemed to be to prevent all the justices being wrong
at the same time. The entire question of the power of congress to issue paper promises and give them a legal tender character was then re-examined pursuant, it was claimed, to the
high behest of the demands of justice. The two new justices
took the view of the legal tender notes held by Justices Miller,
Swayne and Davis, and the former decision of the Chief Justice and Justices Clifford, Field and Nelson was reversed.
Chief Justice Chase's opinion was based upon the fact
that making the notes legal tender gave them no additional
value, hence to give them that character was not of such absolute necessity as he had supposed in 1862.* He held that the
legal tender notes were not money in the sense the constitution
conferred on congress the right to coin the same; and also
that their issue impaired the obligation of existing contracts
and depi'ived persons of their property without due process
of law.
Mr. Justice Strong who wrote the reversing opinion held
that congress alone was the judge of whether the war time
necessity had existed and its conclusion could not be disturbed
by the court. He pointed out that the absence of direct au*$1,250,000.000 in legal tender currency was issued when war expenses exceeded
$2,000,000 a day.
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thority in the constitution to make the notes legal tender did
not prove a lack of such power; that there was, for example,
no authority in the constitution to punish crime, except counterfeiting and treason; that the Federal Bankruptcy Act directly impaired the obligation of contracts which power was
not prohibited to congress by the constitution but to the
states; that the government could not be carried on, the tariff
revised, or war declared without greatly affecting the value of
property without process of law. Both opinions drew freely
on the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall, seeming to find
there, as in the Scriptures, material which anyone might quote
to his purpose.
Much of what appears in the opinions in the Legal
Tender Cases* is pertinent to the present attempt of congress
to create a delicatessen dollar as it is termed by the President's
chief party rival. They also contain arguments for and
against relaxing the restraint of the constitution in case of
what appears to be necessity in peace time. The fact that
Chief Justice Chase was cordially receptive to the presidential
nomination in 1872 or that Justices Strong and Bradley were
disposed to give aid and comfort to his enemies could, of
course, have nothing to do with the soundness of the arguments used.
The interesting fact is that all the lucubrations of the
learned judges did not seem to greatly affect the value of the
treasury promises. When they were legal tender they sank to
$2.85 in paper to $1.00 in gold; after Chief Justice Chase's
opinion deprived them of their legal tender quality they steadily rose to a practical parity with the precious metal. While
the constitutional questions were being settled, Mesdames
Hepburn and Lee probably compromised with their adversaries concerning the insignificant percentage at issue and were
doubtless greatly astonished to see such prodigious judicial
oaks grown from such small acorns.
The importance of decisions on constitutional questions
seem to be in inverse proportion to their subject matter.
Doubtless it is such trifles of which the law, in the sense of
the Latin maxim, is so oblivious.
*12 Wall. 457.

LAND DESCRIPTIONS
(By JESSE H. SHERO.MAN, of the Denver Bar)
Denver is located partly in Township 3 South, Range
68 West.
Question. South of what?
Answer. South of the Base Line.
Question. West of what?
Answer. West of the 6th Principal Meridian.

THE

above questions are so elementary to most members of the Bar that no answers are required, but from
the number of incorrectly written land descriptions appearing in deeds, mortgages and legal advertisements, it is evident that the location and relative position of the Base Lines
and Meridians used in the description of Colorado land, are
not universally understood.
In locating any tract of land, reference must be made to
some line running east and west, known as a Base Line, and
to a line running north and south, known as a Meridian.
It is unfortunate that land descriptions in the major portion of Colorado should be tied to a Base Line which has no
name, and to the 6th Principal Meridian, which lies over 400
miles east of Denver. In a mountainous state, like Colorado,
prominent mountain peaks should have been used as initial
points for land surveys. If conspicuous mountain peaks had
been used for the intersection of Base Lines and Meridians, it
would be possible for any person, familiar with the topography of the state, to visualize the location of any tract of
land in the state by its distance from the mountain peak referred to in the description. This plan was adopted in California. The San Bernardino Base Line and the San Bernardino Meridian cross at right angles on the summit of San
Bernardino Peak, and land in Southern California is described
as in Township north or south of the San Bernardino Base
Line and east or west of the San Bernardino Meridian.
Farther north in California, another Base Line and
Meridian were made to cross on the summit of Mount Diablo.
Land in that vicinity is described as in Township north or
south of the Mount Diablo Base Line and east or west of the
Mount Diablo Meridian.
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Throughout all of the public surveys, names have been
given to the Meridians, but many of the Base Lines are nameless. The California system of naming the Base Lines is commendable. In Utah the Salt Lake Meridian and Base Line
intersect at Salt Lake City.
In other western states natural objects are used for the
intersection of Base Lines and Meridians. Rivers are common
places for starting surveys. In Arizona the Base Line and the
Meridian intersect at the junction of the Gila River with the
Salt River. They are known as the Gila and Salt River Base
and Meridian.
In New Mexico the New Mexico Base Line intersects the
New Mexico Principal Meridian at a point on the Rio Grande
south of Albuquerque.
It is much easier for a surveyor to start a survey on level
land than it is to run lines from the top of a mountain and
we find but few mountain peaks in use as the focal poi-ts for
surveys, notwithstanding their manifest value for such purposes.
Nebraska and Kansas use the 40th parallel of north
latitude as their joint Base Line. This is the line dividing
the two states.
When Colorado was surveyed this joint Base Line, used
by Nebraska and Kansas, was extended westerly across the
state of Colorado and adopted as the Base Line for most of
our state. This is the Base Line referred to in the description of land in the vicinity of Denver and throughout all of
Eastern and Northern Colorado. It has no name nor any
natural object to identify its location. It is known simply as
"The Base Line." It commences at the east boundary line of
Colorado at the point dividing Nebraska and Kansas, and,
following it westerly, it forms the north line of Adams County and the south line of Weld County. The east and west
County Road immediately north of the Sugar Factory at
Brighton follows this line. At Lafayette the line separates the
Cemetery from the Town of Lafayette. Thence it runs westerly, just south of Boulder, across the mountains to the west
line of the state, where its use as a Base Line was discontinued.
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Townships south of this Base Line are known as Townships South. Townships north of this Base Line are known
as Townships North. The first Township south of the Base
Line is known as "Township One South." The second
Township south of the Base Line is known as "Township
Two South." Denver being in the third Township south of
the Base Line is in Township Three South. The same plan,
reversed, applies to Township north of the Base Line. Greeley
being in the fifth Township north of the Base Line is in
Township Five North.
In the absence of some natural object to locate this Base
Line north of Denver, the Brighton Sugar Factory may be
used as a monument or marker to which mental reference can
be made in reading land descriptions. This factory is immediately south of the Base Line, but it is in Range 66, which
throws it a few miles east of Denver.
In Southwestern Colorado the surveys are tied to the
New Mexico Base Line and the New Mexico Principal Meridian. This Meridian enters Colorado in the vicinity of Pagosa
Springs and extends northerly into Colorado a distance of
about 100 miles.
Another short Base Line and Meridian, known as the
Ute Base Line and Meridian, have been established near Grand
Junction.
Three Base Lines are in use in Colorado and the principal one has no name. The inconvenience of having no name
for a Base Line is particularly annoying in describing land in
Western Colorado. Land may be so located that it becomes
necessary to refer to the Ute or New Mexico Base Line and
also to the nameless Base Line.
A Range is a series of things in a row, as a range of
mountains, or a mountain range. A number of Townships
in a row, north and south constitute a Range of Townships,
commonly called a Range. A string of beads laid in a straight
row, north and south, each bead representing a Township,
will serve to illustrate a Range. If a number of strings of
beads should be laid on a map, side by side, parallel with and
immediately west of the 6th Principal Meridian, the first
string west of the 6th Principal Meridian would represent
"Range One West of the 6th Principal Meridian." The next
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string would be "Range Two West of the 6th Principal
Meridian," and when 68 strings, representing 68 rows of
Townships, or Ranges, are laid in parallel lines on the map,
we reach Denver, which is in Range 68 West of the 6th
Principal Meridian. As each regular Range is six miles wide,
we find Denver to be about 400 miles west of the 6th Principal Meridian. This illustration is intended only to show
the method of locating any Range west of the 6th Principal
Meridian. The curvature of the earth prevents the establishment of 68 parallel Ranges, all of the same width and, consequently, in making surveys, the Range lines are broken and
shifted at intervals to adjust them to this curvature.
The improvement in the general scheme of making
public surveys is noticeable in a study of the surveys as they
were extended west. To locate land in Utah, one can start at
Salt Lake City where the Salt Lake Base Line and Salt Lake
Meridian intersect, but in order to locate a tract of unplatted
acreage in Denver, it is necessary to start in Eastern Kansas at
the 6th. Principal Meridian and run west about 400 miles
and then to start again at the nameless Base Line between
the Sugar Factory at Brighton and the Cemetery at Lafayette
and run south.
Land descriptions are frequently bungled through improper punctuation and by the use of the unnecessary word
"of." The deed records in the Recorder's office are filled with
errors of this kind and they have even crept into judicial decisions. In 19 Colorado 247 a tract of land is twice described
as being in "Section 1, Township 4, south of Range 64
West." This is an impossible description. The word "south"
refers to the Base Line and not to the Meridian. The word
"of" is unnecessary and misleading. The description should
have been written: "Section 1 in Township 4 South; Range
64 West of the 6th Principal Meridian."
The common practice of describing a Range as "of
Range" should be discontinued. The word "of" adds nothing to the description and, without proper punctuation, the
word is meaningless. The word is particularly confusing to
stenographers, who do not know where to place the punctuation mark. The printers who correct our spelling and supply
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most of the punctuation marks for us, are generally unable
to correctly punctuate land descriptions in legal notices.
The description of land is usually followed by the name
of the county where the land is located. This is a convenient
thing and many descriptions would be unintelligible without
it, but where a description is fully and correctly written, the
name of the county is unnecessary. In 52 Colorado 166, the
Court very properly held that where the name of the wrong
county followed an accurate description of land by Township and Range, the name of the county was unimportant
and would be considered surplusage. The description was
held to be complete without any county.

THE SUPREME COURT RULE RESPECTING
CITATIONS IN BRIEFS
By FRED Y. HOLLAND, Librarian, Supreme Court

THE

rule requiring the proper citing of cases from published reports is often overlooked or ignored in preparing briefs, although the Supreme Court has forcefully called attention to the rule in several of its opinions in
recent years.
Supreme Court Rule No. 42 reads as follows:
"In citing cases from published reports,
be given as well as the volume and initial page
on the matter for which the citation is made
is published in more than one series of reports,
report should be given, if possible."

the title of the case shall
and also the page wheremay be found. If a case
the citation to the official

This rule recognizes the fact that strict compliance is not
always possible. Current reports of several important courts,
both Federal and State, are found only in the National Reporter System. Examples are:
United States Circuit and District Court reports from
1880;
All decisions of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals since its organization in 1891;
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The Texas Civil Appeals Reports, from volume 63,
published in 1910, to date; and others.
The Supreme Court also recognizes the fact that the official reports are not always accessible in every part of the
state. If such is the fact it should be noted at the beginning
of the briefs. However, in the absence of the official reports,
if the National Reporter Blue Book, or Shepard's Citations,
or the American Digests are available, the initial page of the
official reports should be shown.
It is not practicable or desirable for each of the Judges
to maintain a complete reference library in his chambers in order to obtain the official citation when it is not shown, or to
enable him to give the citations in his opinion to the unofficial
reports which are customarily given with each official citation.
It is possible, however, to comply with Rule No. 42 in
the great majorjity of cases cited, and in this connection the
Supreme Court has said:
"We direct attention to our rule No. 42, which counsel for the
defendants in error seem to have overlooked when preparing their
briefs." Hicks vs. Cramer, et al., 85 Colo. 409, P. 417.
"We again direct attention to Rule No. 42 of this Court." Industrial Commission vs. Continental Investment Co., 85 Colo. 475,

P. 479.
"Counsel on both sides, in preparing their briefs, have paid no
attention to our Rule No. 42. A failure to comply with that rule may
result in our striking briefs from the files." Smart vs. Radetsky, 8.6

Colo. 93, P. 97.

THE AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY SOCIETY

ON

By FRANCIS S. PHILBRICK of the University of Pennsylvania
December 29th last, in Chicago, an American Legal
History Society was organized and its officers elected.
The president of the new Society is Professor Joseph
H. Beale of the Law School of Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), and the secretary and treasurer is Professor
Francis S. Philbrick of the Law School of the University of
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Pennsylvania (Philadelphia). The organization of the new
Society resulted from the appointment in December, 1932,
by Dean Charles E. Clark of Yale, then president of the Association of American Law Schools, of a committee which
was empowered by the Association to create an organization
to further the study of American legal history. Professor
Beale was the chairman of that committee, and Dean Clark
was himself later made the chairman of a committee on organization (consisting of twenty-one representative legal and
historical scholars) to which was entrusted the preparation of
the new Society's by-laws and the nomination of its first
officers.
The objects of the new Society are thus stated in its bylaws:
"The purpose of the Society shall be to encourage the study and
advance the knowledge of the history of American law by locating,
inventorying, making available, and promoting the scholarly editing
and publication of important source materials; by reporting upon the
progress which is made from year to year in the discovery and editing
of source materials; and by encouraging monographic research and publication."

The plans of the new Society include the early establishment of a Journal of Legal History, and publication of a
series of volumes of legal records.
As respects archives, undertakings are already in progress
which give promise of very rapidly advancing the plans of
the Society throughout the country, without expense to it.
Beginnings have been made in the preparation of bibliographies of legal history in two states. Other, though minor,
tasks require a prompt increase of the Society's funds. Success in its undertakings will be facilitated in proportion as it
can broaden and intensify among practicing lawyers, everywhere, interest in its purposes as above declared. Any person
may join the Society, the dues for ordinary membership being $2.00; for a sustaining membership, $10.00. It is hoped
that many who apply for membership may offer suggestions
of work which they think should be initiated in their respective states.

A STATE POLICE
(President Arnold of the Denver Bar Association submits his views to Prof. James
Chadbourn of the University of North Carolina.)

Prof. James Chadbourn,
February 23, 1934.
Assistant Professor of Law,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.
"Dear Professor Chadbourn: I have just finished a careful reading of your valuable article in the February number of
the American Bar Association Journal, on 'Lynching and
the Law,' and would like to submit to you two suggestions
in connection with that subject:
"1. After considerable reflection, I believe that one of
the most potent methods for ridding a state of the lynching
evil would, and eventually will, be the establishment of a
force of well-trained and highly efficient state police.
"As you may recall, the Wickersham Commission concluded that the reasons and arguments in favor of such forces
in the respective states are 'unanswerable.' An interesting
article on the subject appears in the February 17 number of
the Saturday Evening Post, entitled, 'The Twilight of the
Sheriff.'
"2. In your article, in considering the use of troops,
you inquire, 'Should the military commander or the local
sheriff be in charge?' and then answer the question correctly
by saying, 'These cases seem to demonstrate the need of placing complete authority in the hands of the military.' I think
a vast amount of mischief and confusion would be eliminated,
and numerous lynchings avoided, if governors and national
guard officers thoroughly understood the constitutional principle of martial law that makes it wholly unsound and anomalous ever to put a military force under the control of any
peace officer, or of any civil officer (except, of course, the governor, who is its commander-in-chief).
"If so inclined, you might be interested in referring to
an article on martial law in the September, 1929, number of
the American Bar Association Journal, where I try to clarify
this point.
"State police forces not only impart some much-needed
energy to our state governments, but make the constant use
of troops on such duty unnecessary.
"Am trespassing upon your time with these suggestions,
because I think all ideas on this subject should be considered;
and no doubt your own efforts will have much influence in
aiding the country to stamp out this savage evil of lynching."

'Dictaph un_;
WHAT NOT TO PRINT!
The eminent Colorado Graphic (Bronx cheer for the advertising
department) has been running a thrilling serial by Philip S. Van Cise,
Esq., entitled "What Not to Print." It is suspected that some recent
research into the law of libel caused the doughty colonel to have so
many citations in hand, or up his sleeve, or something. Anyway, he
refers to Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 86 N. W. 323, and the Graphic
fearlessly, and we fearfully, requote the quote about the famous Cherry
sisters:
"Effie is an old jade of 50 summers, Jessie a frisky filly of 40, and
Addie, the flower of the family, a capering monstrosity of 35. Their
long skinny arms, equipped with talons at the extremities, swung mechanically, and anon waived frantically at the suffering audience. The
mouths of their rancid features opened like caverns, and sounds like the
wailings of danmed souls issued therefrom. They pranced around the
stage with a motion that suggested a cross between the danse de vertu
and fox trot,-strange creatures with painted faces and hideous mien.
Effie is spavined, Addie is stringhalt, and Jessie, the only one who
showed her stockings, has legs with calves as classic in their outlines as
the curves of a broom handle."
After seeing the plaintiffs in court, and hearing the evidence, the
court directed a verdict for the newspaper, and said:
"If there ever was a case justifying ridicule and sarcasm-aye, even
gross exaggeration,-it is the one now before us."

THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF COMES CLEAN
Conscience-stricken by his thefts of material intended for Dictaphun and used for his own ends, and little recking the terrific trimming
the Editor of Dictaphun was going to hand the Editor-in-Chief in a
suit to be tried later that month before Mr. Justice Otto Bock, the
Editor-in-Chief on February 10 sent us a clipping from the Daily Journal. He queried, "Can Dictaphun use a safer civilization?" We hardly
feel safe in this civilization, but to the point, that is, the clipping:
"WHITSITTS ADD-34 & 35 b 8 Duren J. H. Ward to Far
Reaching Foundation Toward Safer Civilization $10."
131
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An anonymous contributor, and we welcome such, appreciates the
postal revenues two cents by sending us a clipping from a well known
afternoon Denver newspaper. It is from the issues of February 11 last,
It
and appears in want ad classification 50, entitled "Let's Swap."
reads:
"Legal services, fully licensed, for livestock, feed, what have you?
Box 2, K 150."
IS IT BETTER TO KNOW THE LAW, OR THE JUDGE?
Frank Swancara, Esq., appreciates the postal revenues one penny
by handing us the following on a post card:
"Dictaphun: In Smith v. Phelps, 28 P. (2d) 1004, our supreme
court says that if one thinks he has been wrongfully prosecuted 'the
remedy is not to sue the judge.' The syllabus in the Pacific Reporter
puts it thus: 'Remedy of defendant, convicted of assault and battery
a'nd committed to jail, for any errors committed by judge, is not to sue
judge.' What relief would be obtained by the use of this 'remedy' is
not explained. It has one thing in its favor. It costs nothing. Not
even a docket fee is required when one chooses the 'remedy' described
as 'not to sue the judge.' "
BILL COLLECTION AGENCIES FACING POSTAL LAW QUIZ
The federal government will open an investigation today of several large collection agencies, accused of violating the postal laws in
sending out "dunning" letters to slow-paying debtors. Assistant District Attorney Edward A. Fisher said that two officials of one collection
agency, affiliated with a large furniture house, would be questioned this
morning.
Two types of offenses have been discovered in preliminary Investigations. One violates a postal law in that libelous and obscene matter
is printed on the outside of the envelope. The other is a violation of
the Lindbergh law, which makes it a crime to send threatening letters
through the mail.
One firm threatened to distribute handbills, carrying a record of
the debtor's account, and to post large bills carrying his record and his
picture, in his home town. Another firm sent letters to creditors, the
envelope carried an "alias" in large letters following his real names, and
the inclusion of a name reflecting on his character.--Chicago Tribune,
January 20, 1934.

WILLS-LOST WILLS-METHODS

OF PROOF-COMPETENCY

OF

WITNESSES-Eder vs. The Methodist Church Association-No.
12770-Decided January 15, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Eder died in 1928 and thereafter one Fox was appointed administrator. Thereafter petition was filed seeking admission to probate
as a lost will a carbon copy of such purported lost will. The copy was
admitted to probate as a lost will.
1. Where a caveat to a will is filed the statute contemplates the
filing of the answer of the caveat, and even where the parties without
objection proceed to trial on the theory that the allegations of the caveat
were to be taken as denied, such practice is not commended.
2. The burden of proof is upon the proponents to establish facts
to admit the will but upon the caveat the burden is upon the objectors.
3.
The fact that a witness is attorney for the proponents does
not disqualify him as a witness by the fact that he would be entitled to
fees for his services in a will contest. A beneficiary under the will is an
incompetent witness. The administrator and proponents of the will
being parties to the proceedings and directly interested in the event
thereof, are incompetent witnesses. Where a church is beneficiary under
a will a member of the church is not disqualified as a witness. The true
test of the interest of a witness is that he will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
4. A will, once validly made and published, remains a will although the writing, the best evidence of it, in the absence of intent to
revoke, be lost or destroyed.
5. The declarations of a testator subsequent to the making of
a will with reference to the existence thereof are admissible.-Judgment
reversed.
EJECTMENT-QUIET TITLE-PLEADINGS-CONDEMNATION-MacKenzie vs. Corley-No. 12981-Decided January 15, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
MacKenzie sought to quiet title to 100-foot strip of land formerly
used for railroad right of way. In 1900 the strip of land was condemned for railroad purposes for right of way and damages paid to the
then owner. The land was used for railroad purposes until 1922
when the railroad property was sold by a receiver to Corley. The
railroad later dismantled and the right of way of the railroad converted into a toll road.
The plaintiff claims that this was a change in the granted use
and that plaintiff had a reversionary interest in the land. Defendant
alleged ownership and possession by virtue of deed from receiver and a
133
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right to use it for toll road by virtue of a permit from the United States,
and that the plaintiff purchased the land with full knowledge and made
no objection to expenditure for conversion to a toll road.
Plaintiff's demurrer to the answer was overruled and plaintiff replied denying that the construction, operating and maintaining of the
toll road was with his consent or with the consent of his predecessor.
General demurrer to the reply was sustained and on plaintiff's refusal
to plead further, order of dismissal was entered.
1. While the parties below treated this as an action in ejectment, the pleadings disclose it to be an action to quiet title.
2. While the complaint on its face was insufficient as a complaint to quiet title for lack of necessary allegation of possession, however, the answer alleged ownership and possession and prayed that the
rights of the defendant be determined. This answer gave the Court
equity jurisdiction to determine the controversy and when the plaintiff
filed his reply alleging ownership and right to possession an issue was
made.
3. The answer disclosed a substantial defense if proven.
4. If the plaintiff knew that the defendant waschanging the
use of the right of way from railroad uses to that of a toll road and
allowed the defendant without objection to make expenditures in construction of the toll road he is estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment for the entry of such changed use and is restricted to a
suit for damages. In law he is regarded as having acquiesced in such
action on the part of the defendant and his grantee, the plaintiff herein,
taking title with the same notice is also estopped from maintaining an
action in ejectment or trespass and cannot recover damages for the occupation thereof.
5.
The right to recover damages belongs to the original owner
alone and did not pass with the land to his grantee.
6. These allegations formed an issue and required proof and
the Court was in error in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
replication and dismissing the complaint.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ATTORNEY

AS

EMPLOYEE

WITHIN

ACT-Industrial Commission of Colorado vs. Moynihan-No.
13353-Decided January 22, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Moynihan, an attorney, residing at Montrose, Colorado, was employed by the Oliver Power Co., a public utility corporation, under
retainer and subject to its call for services at any time and while so
employed came to Denver, Colorado, on its behalf, and while returning home was injured in an automobile accident. Moynihan prevailed

in the Court below and the Court below ordered the Commission to
determine the extent of disability and fix compensation.
1. Section 4383 Compiled Laws 1921 as amended Session Laws
1931, page 819, does not exclude members of the legal profession: he
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is, otherwise, within the statute for the enjoyment of its protecting
purpose.
2.
Where a lawyer is especially employed in particular instances
the circumstances may be such as to make him an independent contractor, and, therefore, not entitled to relief by virtue of compensation
legislation.
3.
However, where an attorney, by the terms of his employment,
gives his time and services subject to the call of his employer and is
regularly employed by that client, his employment is not casual, neither
i's he an independent contractor but is an employee within the terms
of the compensation act.--Judgment affirmed.
MANDAMUS-TRANSFER OF SHARES IN CORPORATION-Hertz DrivUrself-System, Inc., et al. vs. Doak-No. 13446-Decided January 22, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Doak brought mandamus to compel the transfer to him of 625
shares of capital stock of defendant corporation. Mandamus was
awarded below.
1. A defendant in a mandamus action cannot defeat same by
filing an answer alleging that the ownership of the stock is in dispute
and offering no proof in support of the answer.
2. Defendant cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the
mandamus proceedings by simply raising issue of ownership.
3.
The duty of corporate officials to issue stock certificates to
those entitled thereto is a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus.
4. Mandamus is a discretionary writ and the order is reversible
for abuse of discretion, but there was no such abuse of discretion in
granting the writ in the present action.
5.
No one is entitled to the writ of mandamus whose right is
not clear and unquestionable and it is not a proper remedy when it is
apparent that the interests of third parties who are not before the Court
are involved, but it is always a proper remedy to procure a transfer of
corporate stock when the facts justify it.
6. A sham answer followed by no proof in support of it cannot
operate as a stalemate to check the petitioner in his rightful demand
for the transfer of stock to which he is entitled on the books of the
corporation.--Judgmentaffirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC EMPLOYER AND PRIVATE EMPLOYER-PUBLIC EMPLOYEE-The
Industrial Commission vs. The State Compensation Insurance
Fund et al.-No. 13408-Decided January 22, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Susman was allowed compensation for injury incurred in accident arising out of and in course of his employment. The employer, a
mining company, was the lessee of minerals in school lease made by
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State Board of Land Commissioners. The award of Industrial Commission was set aside by the District Court and error prosecuted therefrom.
1. In order that an injured workman can fix liability in a public
employer, he must first be in such employment as a public employee.
2. When such workmen is working for a private mining company which is lessee of minerals from the Board of Land Commissioners, he is not a public employee but a private employee and is not
entitled to compensatioa.--Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS-STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON COMMISSION-NECESSITY OF FINDINGS

-- Sherratt et al. vs. The Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. et al.No. 13424-Decided January 29, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Defendants in error were plaintiffs in the trial Court where they
sought to set aside an award of the Industrial Commission and to
review an adverse judgment; the claimant and the commission prosecute
this writ. The judgment of the District Court was to the effect that
the commission acted without and in excess of its powers in making
its award of June 29, 1933, and its affirmation of same on July 10,
1933, and vacated said award and remanded the case to the commission with directions to deny further compensation. This judgment, on
a petition for rehearing, was modified and the case remanded to the
commission for further hearing and proceeding in conformity to the
former ruling of the Court.
1. From the face of the record, the award of April 9, 1931,
was not subject to review other than, and only, upon the commission's own motion. That procedure is prescribed and limited by the
statute. Any supplemental award that would change, alter or modify
the effect of the.award of April 9, 1931, by which the claimant was
found to have fully recovered from his injury, would require a specific
findings as to a change in this recovered condition.
2. The Industrial Commission cannot after it has made an
award to the effect that the claimant had made a complete recovery,
make subsequent awards on the ground that it had overlooked the
original award of April 9, 193 1, and vacate the subsequent awards and
make an award of resumption of payments which still leave the original
award of April 9, 1931, containing a specific findings of complete
recovery.
3. The Industrial Commission wholly failed to follow the statute and if it attempted to disregard the express requirement of the
statute, then it acted without auhority. It did not find that there was
any error or mistake in the award of April 9, 1931, which contained
the specific findings of complete recovery. It did not find that there
had been a changed condition since the date of that award.
4. Authority to award a fixed aggregate amount of compensation
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must come from a finding, in the award, of permanent disability.Judgment affirmed.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS ON INTERROGATORIES FROM THE SENATEIMPORTANCE OF QUESTION-In re Interrogatories of the Senate
Concerning the Constitutionality of House Bill No. 45-No.
13463-Decided January 29, 1934--Opinion en Banc.
The senate of the 29th general assembly by resolution submitted
to this Court certain interrogatories concerning the constitutionality of
a portion of house bill No. 45.
1. Under Section 3 of Article 6 of the Constitution the Supreme
Court is required to give its opinion upon pending legislation only
upon important questions upon solemn occasions when required by
* * *, the Senate, * * *."
2. Extraordinary sessions of the general assembly can only be
convened by proclamation of the Governor and the business transacted
therein is limited to that named in the proclamation.
3.
A bill entitled "An act to provide revenue for the relief of the
unemployed, destitute and suffering," but which in its body provides
for the regulation of the manufacture, sale and use of malt, vinous and
spirituous liquors and merely provides for relief of the unemployed and
destitute by virtue of a small amount of the revenue raised from the
liquor control into the Old Age Pension Fund and setting aside another
small amount for the use of the Colorado State Relief Committee, is
not within the Governor's proclamation and could under no circumstances be valid if passed by the present extraordinary session.
4.
A bill whose chief purpose is other than the raising of revenue
does not become a revenue measure merely because some of its provisions produce revenue.
5.
The legislature cannot go beyond the limits of the business
"specifically named in the proclamation" of the Governor at an extraordinary session.
INTERVENTION-PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION-RIGHT OF DIVORCED
WIFE OF ONE PARTNER TO INTERVENE--Stokes vs. Dollard et

al.-No. 13378-Decided January 29, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke..
Dollard sued Stokes for dissolution of partnership. Mrs. Stokes
filed petition in intervention. Dollard demurred and demurrer sustained.
Mrs. Stokes stood on demurrer and moved for stay of execution. This
was denied. Dollard had judgment in the main case and Mrs. Stokes
brings error.
I. Mrs. Stokes, the intervenor, had a right to stand on her petition when the general demurrer thereto was sustained. She had no
duty to amend or move for leave. That ruling was, as to her, a final

judgment.
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2. That judgment being final Mrs. Stokes was entitled to a stay
of execution.
3. One who has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, or in the success of either party, may intervene.
4. A deserted wife whose absconding husband has no property
save what is tied up in a partnership may intervene in dissolution of
her husband's partnership for the purpose of impounding whatever
interest her husband may be decreed to have therein for the support of
herself and minor children, and is not required to wait before intervening for a final determination of her divorce action.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--SUFFICIENCY OF COMMISSION'S FINDING ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-The Hayden Brothers Coal

Corporation et al. vs. The Industrial Commission et al.-No.
13425-Decided January 29, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
This is an action to review a judgment of the District Court in
affirming a supplemental award for additional compensation made by
the commission upon a review had on its own motion.
1. Where the record discloses a conflict in the evidence before the
commission this Court will not pass upon the weight of the evidence
in a workmen's compensation case. This is exclusively for the determination of the Industrial Commission.
2. Where there is a conflict of evidence and there is competent
evidence to support the findings of fact made by the commission the
findings so made are final.-Judgment affrmed.

FIRE INSURANCE-SUFFICIENCY OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIALFAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF Loss-Home Insurance Company

vs. Taylor-No. 13111--Decided February 5, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Taylor and others recovered judgment below on fire insurance
policy.
1. Where motion for new trial and assignment of error are
merely to the effect that the trial court erred in not finding the issues
joined in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, they are
insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain
a writ of error.
2. Where the insured fails to file proof of loss within time required by the policy, but the insurance company refused to pay the
loss in any event, it waived compliance with the policy requiring notice
of proof of loss.--Judgment affirmed.
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PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-DENTISTS-MEASURE OF LIABILITY-

Brown vs. Hughes-No. 13176-Decided February 5, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Mrs. Hughes recovered judgment in court below against Brown,
a dentist, and against Desmond, a physician and surgeon, for $5,000
damages for death of her husband alleged to have been caused by their
joint and several negligence in pulling 16 teeth and removing his tonsils
at the same operation, at a time when he was in bad health. Among
many assignments of error, the controlling one is that the evidence was

insufficient to justify a verdict.
1. The facts in this case are insufficient to justify a verdict against
the dentist and physician.
2. All that the physician and dentist in this case were required
to render in the way of service, in the diagnosis and treatment of their
patient, was such a degree of skill and care as is ordinarily possessed
by those in the practice of their profession under similar conditions
of the patient and in their particular locality.
3. The defendants here must first have left and entirely abandoned all knowledge acquired in the fields of exploration and adopted
some rash or experimental methods before liability would ensue and
the evidence -wholly fails to evince any want of skill or a reckless
disregard of consequences.--4udgment reversed.

CONSISTENCY - MODIFICATION - Mystic Tailoring
Company vs. Jacobstein, Admx.-No. 13465-Decided February
5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Bertha Jacobstein, as administratrix of her deceased husband's
estate, recovered judgment below for $150.00, for services rendered by
her husband during his lifetime. The company assigns error and the
administratrix assigns cross-error. The deceased was employed by the
company at a salary of $100 per week and for a period of three weeks
was paid no salary. The only defense was that the deceased, being
an officer and stockholder, voluntarily agreed to waive his salary, which
was denied. Counsel for the company argue that the judgment for
$150.00 cannot be reconciled with the evidence and that the judgment
should be for nothing or for $300.00. Counsel for the administratrix
confesses the rule but argues that it was error not to enter judgment
for the full $300.00.
1. A verdict or judgment must be consistent with some legitimate theory of the testimony, and where it is not, should be set aside.
2. In this case, the judgment should have been for $300.00 and
it accordingly is so increased to correspond with the undisputed facts.
-- Judgment modified and affirmed,

JUDGMENTS -
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; ACCIDENT-PROXIMATE CAUSE-Peer

vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado-No. 13441-Decided
February 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Claimant was employed as dishwasher in restaurant and had been
for years and was accustomed to use a metal instrument like a putty
knife to scrape pans and one night while using this scraper, noticed
soreness in palm of hand which later developed into osteomyelitis of the
wrist bone, caused by infection. There was no abrasion of the skin of
the hand or any cut or evidence externally to show how the infection
started. The Commission denied an award which was affirmed by
the District Court.
1. An accident, under the Workmen's Compensation act, must
be traceable to a definite source.
2. The burden of proof is upon claimant to show that her injury was the proximate result of an accident arising out of and in the
course of her employment.
3. The record fails to show that claimant was bruised or injured by the scraper, or what the cause of the injury actually was. It
does not appear that it was in any way attributable to or connected
with her employment.--Judgment affirmed.
WILLS--JOINT TENANCY-Kwatkowski vs. Reindt-No. 13440Decided February 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Under the last will and testament of Kwatkowski he bequeathed
to Herbert E. Canfield and Mary E. Canfield, jointly and severally,
all of his property. Herbert E. Canfield pre-deceased the testator. Testator left no known heirs. The state of Colorado, claiming this was an
estate in common and not a joint tenancy, asserted in the court below
that the proceeds of one-half of the estate must be paid to the state of
Colorado. The court below held it to be a joint tenancy and the state
of Colorado prosecuted error.
1. The laws of Colorado expressly favor tenancies in common
as against joint tenancies.
2. No estate in joint tenancy can be created unless the instrument of conveyance expressly declares that the title shall pass, not in
tenancy in common but in joint tenancy.
3. The terms in a will that two persons shall take, "Jointly and
severally" does not constitute a joint tenancy.-Judgment reversed.
PARTNERSHIP-WHAT

CONSTITUTES-Fisher

vs. Colorado Central

Power Co.-No. 13091-Decided February 5, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Colorado Central Power Co. sued Fisher and Stack as copartners doing business as the Acme Sand & Gravel Co., for approximately $900.00 due on open account for electric power furnished for
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the operation of a gravel pit. Fisher denied that he was a partner. The
cause was tried to the Court and the Power Company had judgment.
1. The Acme Sand & Gravel Co. being an unincorporated association the owners thereof were partners.
2. Neither a specific intent nor a written contract to form a copartnership are essential to its creation.
3.
As to persons who had dealt with a partnership or to whom
it was indebted the responsibility of a partner, in the absence of. notice
of his withdrawal, is clearly settled.
4. The statute requires that a partnership using a trade name
shall file with the County Clerk and Recorder an affidavit setting forth,
among other things, the names and addresses of its members.
5.
Fisher was in personal charge of the finances of the Acme Sand
& Gravel Co. and his office was its office, he received its money and bills
of this particular creditor against it were sent to him there and paid there
by his employee without protest and sometimes by checks of a corporation which he owned or controlled, and he owned the land on
which the gravel pit was operated.--Judgmentaffirmed.
TAXATION-UNIFORMITY OF ASSESSMENT--Colorado Tax Commission vs. ColoradoCentral Power Co.-No. 12949-Decided February 5, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
This action was commenced in the District Court in Jefferson
County by the Colorado Central Power Co. under C. L. 1921, Section
7287. It seeks to set aside the assessment of the company's property
heretofore made for the year 1929 by the Colorado Tax Commission
on the principal ground that the assessment was illegal and not uniform with the assessment made against other like parties. The Court
below reduced the Commission's assessmenxt of $863,100.00 to $569,460.00.
1. A motion has been filed in this Court to dismiss the proceedings in error, the ground being that the judgment of the Court below
is not subject to review. The motion is denied.
2. A judgment of the District Court even in a purely statutory
proceeding will be deemed to fall within the general provision for review by this Court where no contrary intention is expressed.
3.
The record fails to sustain the charge that the assessment was
illegal. Where the evidence shows a substantial difference between the
many assessed corporations that exactly similar computations are impracticable and incapable of accomplishing a fair and proportionate assessment the same and identical plan is not required to be applied to
each one. All taxpaying properties of this character must necessarily
be considered from many angles. No single method can be applied to all.
4. The description in C. L. 21, paragraphs 7343-7345 reveal a
plain legislative purpose to place an effective screen of secrecy around the
information elicited from public utility corporations by the inquisitorial
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powers of the Commission, and with this the judicial branch cannot
rightfully interfere.
5. Before an objection to the evidence can be considered a record
must not only show the offer and refusal thereof but the materiality
of it.--Judgment reversed.
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